
Bert Marievoet
In this Connexi podcast, Bert Marievoet walks through the three pivot points of his career: leaving the safety of De Persgroep in 2014 to open Twitter's Belgian office, starting his influencer marketing agency Native Nation in 2016 after being laid off when Twitter shut most European offices, and selling it to SBS in October 2019 — only for COVID to gut the activation-heavy revenue and for SBS's lack of ambition to push him out. He shares hard lessons on hiring for skills, hiring operational profiles to complement his visionary style, and making expectations 'crystal clear' when selling your company because contracts alone leave room for conflicting interpretations. Today he runs web3 fund Moonbag and is building One Of Us, a 'LinkedIn for web3 communities', having just closed a seed round in a very difficult funding climate. He closes with the mindset lesson that both your worst and your best days pass, referencing the 2021 bull market and subsequent crash.
Insights & takeaways
Across three conversations spanning 2023 to 2025, Bert Marievoet tells essentially one story with different chapters: he keeps building things from nothing, keeps losing money and time doing it, and keeps insisting that the discomfort of starting over is the actual point. "Ik wil eigenlijk niet blijven een groot bedrijf groter maken. Ik wil iets creëren, iets maken from scratch. Dat was echt de drang om te gaan ondernemen" 2, he says, and that line explains why he left a well-paid, secure job at Twitter to found Native Nation, and later walked away from a successful agency exit to gamble on web3 and then on a knowledge-monetization platform. He is explicit that the safety of a corporate role, however golden, felt like being reduced to "a number among 4,000 people" 2, and that real entrepreneurial "eindverantwoordelijkheid" cannot be compared to failing safely inside someone else's company 3.
A recurring mechanical theme is that opportunity often comes from one uncomfortable, proactive act rather than from credentials. He got the Twitter Belgium job by cold-emailing the VP Europe while he was simultaneously being courted by Facebook, effectively inventing his own opening 23; he calls the email itself the hinge point, "een gewegd mailtje dat heel veel in beweging heeft gezet" 2. The same restlessness shows up in how Native Nation grew: the agency scaled to €3M in recurring revenue by selling ambitious campaigns first and only figuring out execution afterward, a controlled version of fake-it-till-you-make-it he sums up as "toffe campagnes bedenken, die verkopen en dan eigenlijk naar elkaar intern zeggen: hoe gaan we deze doen? Was elke keer gelukt" 2. It worked until it didn't: the punishing pace of the early solo-founder phase meant he "echt kapot gewerkt, sliep drie uur per nacht" 3, and he leaned on twice-daily transcendental meditation as a literal survival mechanism, describing his alternative to consulting ChatGPT as sitting at the window and simply trying to feel what's next 2.
Marievoet is unusually candid about failure and about reframing it as data rather than identity. "Ik heb fantastisch veel geld verloren," he says flatly 2, and he treats Wagmi Beer's collapse (blocked by state-by-state US alcohol licensing) as a straightforward lesson to research regulatory constraints before launching, not as a wound to nurse 2. His broader philosophy of risk is almost Buddhist in its symmetry: "Niks is nooit zo erg dan dat je het inschat. En omgekeerde is niks vaak zo fantastisch als dat je het inschat" 2. On the emotional cycle of founding companies he's equally direct, recalling that in 2021 people around him were paper millionaires and two years later the mood had reversed completely: "Uw slechtste dagen gaan voorbij en uw beste... daar moet je gewoon van bewust zijn dat er ook terug slechte dagen komen. Het is een oneindig iets" 3.
On selling a company, he draws a sharp distinction between legal terms and lived expectations. Negotiating the Native Nation sale to SBS/Telenet taught him that "verwachtingen staan niet in een juridisch document," and that even with lawyers on both sides, interpretation disputes surfaced months later because expectations hadn't been made "crystal clear" up front 3. The earnout structure itself became a cautionary tale: selling 100% of the shares but collecting only 70% of the cash upfront meant that when COVID crushed activation-driven revenue by 70-80%, the remaining earnout evaporated 2. He's equally unsentimental about what happens after an exit: SBS, hemmed in by Telenet's oversight, never had real ambitions for the agency, and he eventually left after asking leadership why they'd even bought it 3. He's also clear that a successful exit buys no credibility elsewhere: pitching investors on a new tech startup, he found that his agency track record counted for nothing since nobody knew he could build or lead an actual product, making the seed round for One Of Us far harder than raising for Native Nation had been 3.
His theory of early-stage company-building centers on two sequenced concepts: founder-product fit before product-market fit, and team before product when it comes to investor conviction. He learned the first the hard way when his first two Beam co-founders quit a week after launching at Web Summit because they'd stopped feeling the product, forcing a restart: "Je hebt zoiets als een founder product fit ook. Nog voordat je product market fit hebt, de stap daarvoor is eigenlijk de founder product fit" 2. The second belief, that investors bet on the team's ability to pivot rather than on the current product, is inseparable from his insistence that pivoting itself requires zero ego. "Er is geen plaats voor ego en twee: snel durven schakelen," he says, arguing the customer's signal is worth ten times more than the founder's own opinion, and that founders who wait years hoping a stale idea will click simply miss the window 2. He applies the same logic to recruiting people without salary in the early days: you win them over by making the equity story credible and by refusing to be stingy with shares, on the principle that "je samen met goede mensen iets heel groot kunt maken als je daar niet gierig in zij in aandelen" 2, preferring, in his words, a smaller slice of a much bigger pie.
His hiring philosophy sharpened painfully across ventures. At Native Nation, recruiting from his own media-world network based on past job titles rather than actual skills led to bad hires and constant turnover; he later concluded you have to hire for what people have actually done, not what they once were called 3. He also learned he personally lacked the temperament for operations and needed an early operational counterpart obsessed with timesheets and structure to balance his own visionary, business-development instincts 3. This self-diagnosis carries into how he frames Beam's core insight: platforms become victims of their own success, and once LinkedIn's user base swelled past a billion its signal-to-noise ratio collapsed, opening space for an algorithm-free, follower-first knowledge platform where experts monetize calls, webinars and PDFs directly 2. He pitches it, only half-joking, in
- He warned De Persgroep leadership early that Facebook and Google would hurt HLN's advertising revenue, but leadership laughed it off, believing brands needed premium, brand-safe environments — a key reason he left the 'slow tanker'.
- He proactively cold-contacted Twitter's VP Europe while holding a Facebook contract offer, effectively creating his own job opening Twitter's Belgian office.
- In an early-stage startup you must hire for actual skills, not past titles; recruiting from his own network based on what people had done in classic media led to bad hires and high rotation.
- He learned to hire an operational counterpart early — someone obsessed with timesheets and structure — because as a visionary business developer he lacked the passion and skills for operations.
- When selling your company, get emotion out of negotiations and make expectations 'crystal clear' beyond the legal contract, because even with lawyers on both sides interpretation disputes emerged six months later.
- SBS never had real ambitions for Native Nation post-acquisition, partly because Telenet oversight made the culture defensive; Bert left after asking why they even acquired the agency.
- A successful agency exit gives no 'free tickets' when raising for a tech startup: investors questioned who would build and lead the product since he'd earned no track record in apps, making the seed round much harder.
- One Of Us deliberately ignores Belgium as a market: 70-80% of the potential audience is in the US, so the go-to-market targets American web3 communities from day one.
- The biggest challenge for a new social/networking app is the cold start problem: users have limited attention, so you need an outstanding reason for them to spend time on yet another app.
- Platforms become victims of their own success: once LinkedIn passed 1 billion users its signal-to-noise collapsed, creating the market opening for Beam as an algorithm-free, follower-first knowledge platform.
- He got the job launching Twitter Belgium by cold-emailing the VP Europe while being headhunted by Facebook — a single proactive email changed his career trajectory.
- He left a well-paid Twitter job because being 'a number among 4,000 people' in a golden cage felt unfulfilling; the drive was to create something from scratch rather than make a big company bigger.
- Native Nation scaled to €3M recurring revenue by consistently taking on more work than they could handle, selling ambitious campaign ideas first and figuring out execution afterwards — controlled 'fake it till you make it'.
- Twice-daily 20-minute transcendental meditation was his survival mechanism during the chaotic solo-founder phase, based on the claim that 20 minutes recuperates as much as hours of sleep.
- Selling 100% of the shares but receiving only 70% of the cash meant COVID wiped out the remaining 30% earnout when Native Nation's activation-driven revenue fell 70-80% — a lesson in earnout risk.
- Before product-market fit there is founder-product fit: his first two Beam co-founders quit a week after the Web Summit launch because they no longer felt the product, forcing a restart.
- Early-stage investors bet on the team, not the product, because a strong team can pivot when market conditions change; a solo founder can barely raise money.
- You recruit early team members without salary by making the equity upside credible and by not being greedy with shares: 'liever een kleiner stuk van een grote taart'.
- Successful pivoting requires zero ego — the customer is ten times more important than your own opinion — and the courage to switch fast rather than muddle along for years until the window closes.
- Beam removes the 'awkward culture' around charging for your time: a booking link with a price replaces the uncomfortable 'transfer me €200 first' conversation, which he found is as taboo in the US as in Belgium.
- Wagmi Beer failed because US state-by-state alcohol licensing blocked exports — a reminder to research regulatory constraints before launching, and that competitors were shipping beer labeled as something else.
- Entrepreneurship doesn't get easier with repeat founding, but you learn faster from mistakes and waste less money; experience mainly speeds up detecting what blocks your progress.
Career
BEAM#405factoryManaging founderMay 2023 – Present
- Moonbag CapitalCo founderOct 2020 – Present
- Wagmi Beer LabFounderMay 2022 – Apr 2023
- Nobi BVCo founderOct 2020 – Mar 2022
- Stream32Managing founderSep 2018 – Sep 2020
- Native NationManaging founderNov 2016 – Oct 2021
- TwitterCountry ManagerApr 2014 – Oct 2016
- De Persgroep AdvertisingCommercieel DirecteurJun 2008 – Apr 2014
- Adlink MediaSales DirectorMar 2007 – May 2008
Proximus#5factoryDifferent b2b sales positionsNov 2003 – Mar 2007
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management#6schoolExecutive Master, Marketing and Advertising2004 - 2004
- Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel#139schoolMaster’s Degree, International Relations and Affairs1996 - 2000
From public career histories · 12 entries
Media & appearances
2- 2podcastBen's Mentors · 11 Jun 2025
Serial entrepreneur Bert Marievoet recounts selling Native Nation and Galaxy to Telenet, failed ventures like Wagmi Beer, and pitches Beam, an 'OnlyFans for thought leaders' letting experts monetize knowledge via paid calls, webinars and PDFs with a 15% platform fee.
- 3podcastConnexi · 28 Aug 2023
Bert Marievoet recounts leaving De Persgroep to launch Twitter Belgium in 2014, founding and selling influencer agency Native Nation to SBS, and now building web3 networking app One Of Us after a tough seed raise.