Kristof Tuyteleers
The core discussion covers DNS Belgium's decision, matured over 10 years of annual risk assessments, to leave AWS and find a fully European alternative for its registry systems, driven by geopolitical risk and its exemplary role as manager of Belgium's critical .be infrastructure. Tuyteleers explains vendor lock-in, the 'too big to regulate' power concentration among a handful of cloud players, the compliance burden disadvantaging European providers, and the loss of the internet's original decentralized, redundant design. He urges companies to at least prepare technically for potential migrations and to reinvest ICT spending in European technology to restore innovation capacity.
Insights & takeaways
Kristof Tuyteleers speaks as someone who has had to translate an abstract policy debate into an operational decision, and that grounding shapes everything he says. As CISO of DNS Belgium, he frames the migration away from AWS not as a technical upgrade but as an obligation tied to the organization's role: "Wij zijn een kritische component in het internet in België. Dus wij vinden het gewoon onze verdomde plicht om ervoor te zorgen dat we klaar zijn" 12. This sense of duty recurs throughout his thinking. He is careful to note that DNS Belgium never ran its core DNS 'address book' function on cloud infrastructure, only the registrar/notary function, and that even that more limited exposure eventually came to look too risky 12. The decision, he stresses, was not a reaction to a single incident but the product of an annual risk assessment repeated for more than a decade, during which geopolitical risk simply kept climbing until it tipped the scale 12.
A central theme is demystifying the cloud itself. Tuyteleers repeatedly punctures the term with a plain, almost dismissive definition: "De cloud, dat is een heel duur woord voor het is iemand anders computer" 12. This is not a rejection of cloud technology as such, but an insistence that organizations recognize what they are actually doing when they outsource: handing control of their infrastructure to someone else's machine, often on someone else's continent. From there he builds his sovereignty argument: "Als alles aan het internet hangt en we hebben eigenlijk bijna geen controle meer over dat internet zelf, over die snelweg, die datasnelweg. Ja, hoe soeverein zijn we dan nog?" 12. For him sovereignty is not an ideological posture but a direct consequence of losing control over infrastructure that everything else depends on.
He is equally direct about the scale of power concentration in Big Tech, coining his own shorthand for it: "Ik noem dat too big to regulate" 12. His point is not simply that these companies are large, but that their war chests let them pre-emptively absorb not just startups but mid-size companies that might otherwise mature into competitors, which he sees as an unhealthy concentration of power that regulation has failed to check 12. He extends this into a sharp observation about unintended consequences: EU privacy legislation aimed partly at reining in the ad market ended up entrenching Google's position in online advertising, a case study he uses to show that good intentions in regulation can still produce the opposite of the desired effect 12.
Tuyteleers is also attentive to how dependency reproduces itself structurally, beyond mere convenience. He points to education as a quiet mechanism of lock-in: schools now train graduates almost exclusively on American cloud technology rather than open standards, so the next generation of engineers arrives already fluent in dependency 12. He pairs this with a market-distortion argument, noting that European providers face higher compliance costs to prove regulatory adherence than American competitors selling into the same market, which undercuts their ability to compete on cost 12. Running through both points is a conviction that Europe's malaise is not a talent problem but a funding and infrastructure problem: "Wij zijn toch altijd een innovatief continent geweest. Maar voor innovatie is er geld nodig" 2. He wants European ICT and ad spending redirected toward local providers so that money gets reinvested in European innovation rather than leaking abroad, weakening both local media and local ICT companies in the process 12.
On what the internet has become, his diagnosis is that decentralization has quietly failed. The network was built for redundancy, but as everything from smart meters to cars gets connected to it, control has concentrated in six to ten companies, so a single cloud outage can take down a large share of a country's websites at once. He calls this what it is: "Er is helemaal geen redundantie niet meer. Het is een soort schijnredundantie" 12. This is paired with a broader plea to institutions and individual businesses alike, delivered in his most memorable line: "Leg al je eieren niet in dat ene mandje" 12. He applies this concretely to SMEs, warning against building a business entirely on Instagram or Facebook, since profile blocks are often impossible to appeal or even understand, and urging companies to maintain their own website and domain as a baseline of resilience 12.
His concrete takeaway for organizations is pragmatic rather than alarmist: companies do not need to migrate away from Big Tech providers immediately, but they should be technically ready to do so, containerizing workloads and treating a potential migration as a plannable project rather than a crisis response, especially if they operate anything resembling critical infrastructure 12. Even here, though, he is candid about the limits of his own solution. Having moved DNS Belgium toward a European provider, he admits openly that the organization has no ready answer for what happens if that provider is later acquired by an American Big Tech player, something their financial firepower makes entirely plausible 12. That admission is characteristic of his overall stance: confident about the direction of travel and the urgency of acting, but honest that sovereignty, once ceded, is not easily or permanently reclaimed.
- DNS Belgium never used cloud for its DNS 'address book' function (always self-hosted), only for its registrar/notary function — a deliberate differentiated risk assessment per function.
- DNS Belgium re-evaluated its AWS dependency at least annually for 10 years; there was no single tipping point, but growing geopolitical risk plus the inconsistency of preaching local digital identity while running on US infrastructure drove the final decision to migrate.
- Vendor lock-in is self-reinforcing beyond convenience: as more companies outsource to hyperscalers, schools train graduates only on that American technology instead of open standards, deepening structural dependency.
- EU compliance burden distorts competition: European providers face higher costs to prove regulatory compliance than foreign competitors selling into Europe, making it harder to match American cost-efficiency.
- Companies don't need to migrate immediately, but should be technically ready: containerize workloads and know what a migration would require, treating it as a planned project — for critical infrastructure operators it's a 'damn duty'.
- Big Tech's war chests let them acquire not just startups but mid-size companies pre-emptively, creating a 'too big to regulate' power imbalance; DNS Belgium admits it has no ready answer if its chosen European provider gets acquired by an American player.
- Well-intended EU regulation can backfire: privacy rules aimed partly at the ad market ended up strengthening Google's position in online advertising.
- The bigger risk than a hostile state cutting off internet access is the concentration itself: 6-10 companies now control the once-decentralized, hyper-redundant internet, while everything from electricity meters to cars is connected to it — cloud outages create only 'schijnredundantie' (fake redundancy).
- The strongest argument for buying European: money spent on local providers gets reinvested in European innovation, whereas ad and IT budgets currently leak to the US, weakening both local media and local ICT companies.
- SMEs shouldn't build their whole business on social media platforms: profile blocks are hard to appeal or even understand, so an own website/domain is essential resilience — 'don't put all your eggs in one basket'.
- DNS Belgium never used cloud for its core DNS 'address book' function, only for its 'notary' registration function, and now judges even that too risky, deciding to migrate to a European provider partly because of its role-model function as critical infrastructure operator.
- The decision to leave AWS was not triggered by one event but grew out of a yearly risk assessment over more than 10 years; the geopolitical risk of losing access to American infrastructure gradually increased until the final decision was taken last year.
- Vendor lock-in is reinforced through education: school leavers are now trained only to work with American cloud technology rather than open standards, deepening structural dependence beyond just infrastructure.
- EU compliance burden works as a market distortion: European cloud providers face higher costs to demonstrate regulatory compliance than American competitors, hurting their ability to offer cost-efficient alternatives.
- Well-intentioned regulation can backfire: EU privacy legislation aimed at the advertising market ultimately strengthened Google's position in online advertising.
- Big Tech is 'too big to regulate': companies have amassed war chests large enough to acquire any startup or even mid-size company approaching potential competition, creating an unhealthy power concentration.
- The internet was designed as a decentralized, hyper-redundant system, but we connected everything (smart meters, cars) to it precisely while control was concentrating in six to ten companies, creating a 'sham redundancy' where a single cloud outage takes down 60% of a country's websites.
- Companies don't need to migrate immediately, but should be technically ready: use container technology and a step-by-step plan so a migration away from Microsoft or Amazon is possible when needed.
- An open question DNS Belgium admits it has no answer to: what happens if the chosen European provider is later acquired by an American Big Tech player, which their war chests make entirely feasible.
- Redirecting European ICT spending from American players to local companies gives those companies room to reinvest in innovation, paralleling how ad budgets leaking to US social platforms weaken local media.
- SMEs and startups should not rely solely on Instagram or Facebook for their business presence: profiles get blocked, often without explanation or recourse, so an own website under an own domain is essential resilience.
Career
DNS Belgium#508factoryChief Information Security OfficerApr 2020 – Present
- European TLD ISACVice Chair EUR TLD ISAC Working groupMay 2024 – Apr 2025
- European TLD ISACChair EUR TLD ISAC Working groupMar 2023 – May 2024
- CENTRCo-chair CENTR Security Working GroupOct 2019 – Oct 2023
DNS Belgium#508factoryCyber & Information Security OfficerMay 2015 – Apr 2020
DNS Belgium#508factorySenior Systems & Infrastructure EngineerMay 2013 – Apr 2015
- dns.beSenior Systems & Infrastructure EngineerMar 2009 – Apr 2013
Telenet group#18factoryInternet Application Development EngineerApr 2001 – Dec 2008
Telenet group#18factoryInternet product and system support analystFeb 1998 – Apr 2001
- Continental PrintingPre-press supervisorJul 1997 – Dec 1997
- KHMPublic Relations and Communications1994 - 1997
- Sint-Ursula-Instituut#159school1991 - 1994
- CVO MevizaSpecifieke lerarenopleiding
- Koninklijke academie voor beeldende kunsten, MechelenBeeldende vorming
From public career histories · 14 entries
Media & appearances
2- 1podcastVirtual · 26 Mar 2026
DNS Belgium CISO Kristof Tuyteleers explains why the .be registry is migrating away from AWS to a European cloud provider, framing digital sovereignty as an urgent issue of power concentration in Big Tech rather than technical shortcomings.
- 2podcastVirtual · 26 Mar 2026
DNS Belgium CISO Kristof Tuyteleers explains why the .be registry is migrating away from AWS to a European cloud provider, arguing that Big Tech's power concentration and geopolitical risk make dependence on American infrastructure untenable for critical infrastructure.