Kristoffer Van Saet

Kristoffer Van Saet's thinking centers on a single pivot: moving from operator to strategist, and doing it deliberately rather than by accident. Across both appearances he describes a company that grew out of his father's electrical business into something broader, driven by an entrepreneurial instinct that "ging verder als rond de kerktoren die elektrische installatie installeren" ¹. That instinct pushed him toward security specifically because of its recurring revenue model, maintenance and monitoring contracts that create yearly touchpoints with customers and, in his view, drive company value far more reliably than one-off installation work ¹. This is not an abstract preference; it is the backbone of his growth strategy and the reason Van Saet Security became an acquirer rather than a target.

That acquirer posture came out of a concrete decision. Approached by a large private equity player to sell, he and his team chose instead to look inward: "we hebben beslist om dat niet te doen en daartegen zijn we eigenlijk zelf gaan kijken van: waar kunnen we ons bedrijf versterken door overnames?" . He later describes deliberately taking meetings with two private equity parties not to sell but purely to learn how such processes work, then using their offers as a benchmark to confirm his own acquisition strategy had already paid off ¹. This is a recurring trait in how he talks about deals: he treats negotiations and advisor relationships as things to be learned and internalized rather than outsourced. Training in M&A fundamentals, he says, let him communicate "op (roughly) the same level as the advisors" instead of depending on them , and it exposed gaps he did not know existed, admitting he was "toch eigenlijk versteld van de dingen dat we nog niet deden, zoals cashflow planning" .

On valuation, his position has hardened into something almost anti-theoretical. He lists the standard methods, EBITDA, recurring revenue, personnel, IP, and dismisses them as ultimately beside the point: "uiteindelijk is het toch altijd wat de zot ervoor geeft" ¹. Value, in his account, is whatever a specific buyer is willing to pay, shaped by geographic and strategic fit rather than formulas. He backs this with the JM Security case, where a company that looked overpriced became workable only because the previous owner offered a vendor loan and stayed engaged in the business, turning a expensive-looking deal into an attractive one ¹.

The human side of scaling gets equal weight in his account. Doubling the company from 12 to 23 people through acquisition, he says, hit a critical trust threshold: "Heeft ons vorig jaar een enorme boost gegeven, dat heeft voor enorme druk op het bedrijf gezorgd, maar we hebben daar goed mee omgegaan" ¹. He is candid that the integration of 1,500 acquired customers onto unfamiliar systems was underestimated, and that service suffered as a result: "We hebben vorig jaar niet de service kunnen bieden dat we verhoopt hadden, en daar zijn we nu heel veel op aan het werken dit jaar om toch wel eventjes te ademen" ¹. That admission feeds directly into his current plan, a deliberate breathing year of consolidation before pursuing the next acquisition, rather than compounding growth on top of unresolved integration problems.

His approach to delegation and governance is built around hiring people better than himself and then actually letting go. "Wij hebben altijd toppers aangeworven, we hebben nooit gekeken van oké daar moeten we besparen; altijd geïnvesteerd in sterke mensen" ¹, he says, framing this as the precondition for a founder to step back from operations and focus on direction. He explicitly names this shift, from operational work to governing and steering, as the outcome he wants from his own training . The talent question is not abstract to him either; he names the "War for Talent" directly as a live pressure on his sector and points to letting employees participate in the company's growth as the retention lever for technical profiles .

Working with his brother is presented as a structural solution rather than a personal one: fixed meeting days, strictly divided responsibilities, and business kept separate outside those meetings, so staff always know who owns what ¹. He is blunt about why it works: "1 plus 1 gaat hier drie worden en tot op heden is dat echt zo gebleken ook" ¹. Contrast this with his account of losing control at Skard, where bookkeeping, payments and control sat with an investment vehicle while he stayed stuck in operations, an experience he now converts directly into advice: "Als je overweegt om met investeerders aan boord te gaan, dat je van in het begin heel duidelijk de verwachtingen schept" ¹. The lesson is explicit and hard won, expectation-setting with investors is not a formality but the difference between keeping and losing grip on your own company.

Looking forward, his stated plan is structural as much as strategic: a holding company with operating companies underneath, eventually settling on a single group brand while letting each company retain its specialty ¹. Underneath that plan sits a clear ambition for market position, not scale for its own sake but recognized reliability: "Wat zouden graag hebben dat tussen Antwerpen en Brussel van saat security de referentie is, dat mensen zeggen dat je gewoon meer doet als wat de mensen verwachten" ¹. Taken together, his takeaways amount to a fairly disciplined playbook, learn the mechanics of M&A yourself, negotiate from that knowledge rather than deference, value deals on buyer fit rather than formula, hire people you can trust with real delegation, and build in deliberate recovery periods after aggressive growth rather than assuming momentum alone will carry integration through.