Thomas Smet

The through-line

Everything here comes back to a single argument: a bank can lend to a company that has never made a profit, provided it changes what it looks at. The credit basics do not move; the analysis does, from historical figures to a monthly cashflow statement showing when the burn stops and a hard look at why these particular founders can execute [2]. That conviction did not arrive as strategy from above. It started with a mentor at Start it @KBC watching startups get turned away by local branches, experimenting with financing them anyway, and going to get credit-policy backing before building anything, on the logic that "if I can't give them a loan, I shouldn't start" [2]. The founding gesture was as plain as the pitch it was meant to serve: "Dag Alexander, ik ben Thomas en ik heb een idee." [2]

The second, quieter through-line is that the lending relationship is not transactional. Innovation Banking deliberately takes on a quasi-investor role, with quarterly check-ins on sales and runway, feedback on burn rate, and sometimes a cadence synced to the startup's own investor calls [2]. Over years, that becomes an information advantage as much as a service, and the position has hardened into an instruction for founders to demand the same of any lender they choose [2][1].

On lending against the future instead of the past

The unit lends against future cash flow projections rather than historical profits, which is explicitly atypical for a bank [1]. For a startup the underwriting question is not what the P&L has done but when the burn ends, and the answer has to fall within 18 to 24 months, evidenced month by month [2]. Alongside the numbers sits a judgement call that no spreadsheet produces: why can these specific founders execute this plan [2]. Team quality and commercial traction do the work that historical figures do elsewhere [2].

On commercial traction as the one real filter

The single red flag is the absence of revenue. "Er moet commerciële tractie zijn... ergens in de verte moet er een inkomstenstroom beginnen komen die ons toelaat om onze kredieten op termijn af te betalen." [2] Without an emerging revenue stream capable of eventually servicing the credit, a startup should not come knocking, and is sent to Start it @KBC first [2]. Founders systematically underrate the paper that proves this. Pilots and proof-of-concept contracts with blue-chip OEMs, a €200,000 commitment for instance, materially strengthen a dossier, because purchase intent written down is the earliest legible form of traction [2].

On the financial plan the bank actually wants

The plan should be "something in between": not a single A4, not a giant Excel [2]. What matters is a month-by-month cashflow view of income and cost structure rather than a pure P&L [2]. The document is being read for one thing, the point at which money stops leaving, so anything that obscures that timing is noise and anything that clarifies it earns its place.

On staying close after the money lands

Every founder gets a quarterly review meeting, and the runway is colour-coded: orange at six months, red at three [1]. Those sessions cover sales and runway and produce feedback on burn rate, and where it makes sense the bank falls into step with the startup's investor call rhythm [2]. The corollary is an appeal for candour: "Als er een probleem is, kom het mij alstublieft vertellen. Ik kan niet garanderen dat ik het kan oplossen, maar ik kan één ding garanderen: als ik het niet weet, zal ik het niet kunnen oplossen." [2] The commercial payoff is real too. Seeing a company every three months for three years builds a compounding information advantage that lets the bank confidently underwrite the much larger follow-on rounds [2].

On Smart Bank Money and the network

The pitch to founders is to hold banks to the standard they hold investors to. "Er is zoiets als Smart Bank Money. Vraag dat ook, los van bij welke bank dat je gaat: wat doen jullie voor ons?" [2] The claim behind that is scale: "Wij zijn de grootste incubator van Europa, wij zijn de vijfde grootste ter wereld." [2] Incubator and bank feed each other, with Start it @KBC funnelling its best companies toward Innovation Banking, and the network absorbing damage in the other direction, as when five or six employees of a startup running out of runway were redeployed to other startups inside it [2].

On what does not fit

Pure early-stage biotech is excluded, because the long flat stretch of no revenue until FDA approval cannot be bridged with any logical financing structure [2]. This is a statement about the shape of the cashflow curve rather than about the sector: mature, cash-generating biotech sits comfortably in corporate banking [2]. The boundary follows directly from the underwriting logic, since a plan that cannot show burn ending inside 18 to 24 months has nothing for this instrument to grip.

On when to raise

The advice sitting alongside all of this is to resist raising too early. Bootstrap to an MVP with paying customers, then raise 18 to 24 months of runway, because early-stage valuations are lower and going out too soon means giving away too much of the pie [1]. It is the same 18 to 24 month horizon the credit analysis uses, applied to the founder's own dilution rather than the bank's exposure [2][1].

Takeaways

• Bring a month-by-month cashflow statement showing when the burn stops, inside 18 to 24 months, rather than a one-page summary or an unreadable Excel [2].
• No emerging revenue stream means no credit conversation; go to an incubator first and come back with traction [2].
• Get purchase intent on paper. Pilot and proof-of-concept contracts with large OEMs, including commitments around €200,000, are undervalued by founders and strengthen a bank dossier [2].
• Ask every bank concretely what it does for startups before choosing one: "Er is zoiets als Smart Bank Money." [2]
• Tell your lender about problems early: "als ik het niet weet, zal ik het niet kunnen oplossen." [2]
• Expect quarterly reviews on sales and runway, with orange flagged at six months of runway and red at three [1][2].
• Bootstrap to an MVP with paying customers before raising, then raise 18 to 24 months of runway, to avoid giving away too much equity at a low valuation [1].
• Early-stage biotech does not fit cashflow-based innovation lending because the pre-approval revenue gap cannot be bridged [2].